Professor Edward Erickson, an authority on the Ottoman army during
World War I, claims that there is no substantial evidence to support
labeling the counterinsurgency operation against Armenians in 1915 as a
genocide, but neither is there enough evidence to support a denial of
the label.
Regardless of how we refer to the event, it
is now of interest to
historians, and the current Armenian endeavor to convince parliaments of
different countries to pass genocide recognition bills, to come up with
some better factual information, before everyone starts jumping to
conclusions
Erickson, whose 2013 book “Ottomans and Armenians: A Study in
Counterinsurgency” was the first account from a military perspective of
the forced relocations, or “Tehcir" in Turkish, shared his views on what
actually happened a hundred years ago.
A retired US army officer, Erickson delved into the Turkish archives
and researched extensively before writing his book. He concluded that
the Tehcir was vital, as it allowed the Ottoman government to
disaffiliate insurgents from "Entente" (European
powers), had posed a threat to the existence of the empire.
Frankly, the Armenian revolutionary committees were unsuccessful in
achieving their goals; in the end they were crushed, and the majority of
the Ottoman Armenians were either dead or refugees.
One of the major
reasons for the failure of the committees was that the Armenian
revolutionary committees were never a popularly supported movement among
the majority of Ottoman Armenians, who were law abiding Turkish citizens. In
order to be successful, a revolutionary movement must have a base of
popular support and the Armenian revolutionary committees never had
that.
The Ottoman government forced about 400,000 Ottoman Armenians to
relocate. These Armenians mostly lived in six eastern provinces and in
key cities along the army's lines of communication.
Since the Ottoman government and
army were unable to determine which Armenians were actively supporting
the committees and which Armenians were not. They erred on the side of
what they believed to be national security, and relocated all of them
from selected locations.
In 1917, there were still over 350,000 Ottoman
Armenians living in their own homes in what is western Turkey today.
The successful inclusion of any minority in the political process is
problematic at best. Simply having a few representatives in parliament
cannot change the fundamental mismatch of political power.
The successful inclusion of any minority in the political process is
problematic at best. Simply having a few representatives in parliament
cannot change the fundamental mismatch of political power.
The Ottomans felt obliged to adopt a brand-new method to quell
the Armenian insurrection, a method that was expressed in a decree by
the government on May 31,1915. In what ways was this new method
different from the counterinsurgency methods the Ottomans had resorted
to throughout their history?
This was the first time the Ottoman government did not have sufficient
military forces available to deal with rebellion. Traditionally, the
Ottomans dealt with rebellion by sending in the army. In the spring of
1915, without the army in its normal garrisons, the Ministry of War had
to find an alternative to the use of force.
The relocation of the
Armenians from the rear areas of the eastern war zones was the solution
of choice. While relocation was a new approach for the Ottoman Empire,
in fact, it had been widely practiced by the Great Powers.
Confronting the past has nothing to do with it. It is important
to consider that the Ottoman government in 1915 did not “invent”
population removal as a way to deal with rebellion. It was widely used
in practice by many of the Great Powers before World War I. We must also
not forget that the government did not deport the Ottoman Armenians
(deportation is permanent) and that the government intended to allow
them to return to their homes after the war.
The relocations would not have happened if well-known
leaders of the revolutionary committees (Andranik [Ozanian], Dro
[Drastamat Kanayan] and Boghos Nubar, for example had not aligned
themselves (and the committees) with the Russians, British, and French.
Keep in mind that most Ottoman Armenians, and even many of the committee
members, wanted the Ottoman Armenian population to remain law abiding
and support the Ottoman government in 1914. They understood that
rebellion would likely result in the destruction of Armenian lives and
property. However, the actions of a few influential individuals brought
great suffering to the majority of Ottoman Armenians, who were innocent
bystanders.
Tens of thousands of Armenians died during the relocation Were the Ottomans taking some kind of revenge?
There are number of explanations of why this happened. Many historians
believe that hatred and jealousy against the Ottoman Armenians had built
up over several generations. This made it easier for the numerous
atrocities to happen.
There is absolutely no question that the Ottoman government did not
fully consider what might happen to the hundreds of thousands of
relocated Armenians. There is no doubt that the government did not have
the resources to protect, feed and care for the huge numbers of
Armenians under its care.
The relocations were badly managed and under
resourced. The relocation convoys became easy targets for both criminal
gangs and poorly supervised provincial officials. Let us also say that
the Hamidiye cavalry regiments had long since been disestablished by the
Ministry of War, but it is very likely that many of the renegades and
criminals who preyed on the convoys were ex-Hamidiye cavalrymen.
Some historians argue that the Special Organization
(Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa) opted to let things worsen and even facilitated the
mass killings of civilian Armenians en route to the camps. Are these
claims substantiated by historical facts?
The Teşkilat-ı
Mahsusa played no part in the relocations or the massacres of
Armenians that accompanied the relocations and convoys.
Recent scholarly
work by Dr. Ahmet Tetik and Ph.D. candidate Polat Safi establish that
the SO had no part of this. The case against the SO was constructed by
Vahakn Dadrian from a textual analysis of the 1919 newspaper accounts of
the 1919 İstanbul show trials of individuals accused of war crimes.
Dadrian's thesis is incorrect.
The CUP was a secret revolutionary group that did not oppose the use of
terror to achieve its goals. The inner circle of the CUP had overthrown
the Ottoman government and there is no question that Enver and the
other CUP leaders knew exactly how dangerous secret revolutionary
committees could be.
Enver and the leadership of the SO were also
knowledgeable about guerrilla and irregular warfare, which also caused
them to worry about the Armenian revolutionary committees' activities in
1915.
Whether it was a genocide or not. It might have been a genocide or it
might not have been a genocide. To be honest, there is no authentic
evidence (a paper trail of documents) today proving that this was a
top-down, state-sponsored campaign of annihilation. However, neither can
the reverse -- that it was not a genocide -- has been totally proven either.
What I assert is that the Armenian population of six provinces, as
well as selected individuals elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire who were
considered dangerous, were relocated for military reasons related to the
perception that a large-scale Armenian insurgency , coordinated with
and supported by the Russians, was about to erupt.
Bottom-line seems to be that this group of
Armenians was not relocated to be killed; they were relocated as a
precautionary military measure. In the absence of full
evidence, it is premature to attach a label such as genocide to what
happened in 1915.
Ottoman Armenians from all provinces and cities
were relocated, mostly from the six eastern provinces.
However, many
Armenians in the western provinces were excluded from relocation, such
as Protestant and Catholic Armenians, also Armenians who worked on the
railroad system, and also Armenian government officials and Armenian
officers and soldiers (and their families). When the Ottoman government, however, thought, that
Ottoman Armenian had links to, or was sympathetic toward, the
committees, they were relocated.
Most Ottoman Armenians were law-abiding Ottoman empire citizens who had no interest in
rebellion.
The mobilization and war plans, which were aimed at external
threats, did not consider the Ottoman Armenians as an internal threat.
It was only after an escalating series of incidents, including small
rebellions and small landings on the Mediterranean coast by the British
navy in early 1915, that the committees came to be seen as dangerous.
It is beyond doubt that the Armenian revolutionary committees in eastern
Anatolia possessed the capability and the capacity to interdict the
Ottoman army's lines of communications. What does this mean? Simply,
there were small numbers of Armenians in key locations who had the
ability to block and obstruct the flow of supplies (food, fodder and
ammunition) to the Third Army, which was fighting the Russians.
If this
had been allowed to happened, the Third Army would grow progressively weaker and would
be unable to stop the Russians. The Ottoman military staffs believed
that this was happening in March and April 1915 and they had plenty of
reports as evidence.
Consequently the Ottoman government took action (relocations) to
prevent this from happening. The relocations and elimination of the
committees can be compared to cutting out a cancer before it
metastasizes.
In American history, George Washington is a hero, but he
was also a traitor to the British King George III. Washington's side won
the war. Robert E. Lee, a famous confederate general, was also seen as a traitor.
His side lost the war.
So, whether one calls rebels, insurgents and
guerrillas “traitors” depends on who wins or loses the war.
There is no
question that the small numbers of Ottoman Armenians who engaged in
rebellion, terrorism or who fought alongside the Russians were seen as traitors
to the political entity known as the Ottoman Empire of which they were
citizens.
The Ottoman army commanders and staffs saw the hostile
activities of the Ottoman Armenians as evidence of military operations
that were coordinated with and supported by the Russians. The Ottomans
viewed the external operations of the Russian army and Armenian Druzhiny
[legions] as complementary to the internal hostile
Opening up all of the archives on both sides of the argument will be good but probably won't accomplish much. Historians will
never be able to agree conclusively about what actually happened. There
will always be those who believe there was a genocide and those who
think that it was something else.“
Open” archives is also an ambiguous and relative
term. The Turkish archives are open, but it is very hard to gain access
to because of the paperwork involved. For example, research in any
Turkish archives by a foreigner requires a special visa from the Foreign
Ministry.
US and EU archives do not require a special visa
and anyone can walk in and get a research card.
Moreover, the Turkish
military archives are located inside the military compounds in Ankara and
one cannot just “walk in” like at the US archives in College Park,
Maryland or in to EU archives in Bruxelles. in Kew.
That said, however, the Turkish
archives are “more open” than the Armenian archives or the records of
the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, which are not open to International scholars.
Some historians say that the Armenian archives are not open to researchers because they
contain information confirming that the Armenian revolutionary
committees were engaged in an actual conspiracy with the Russians and
the committees intended to conduct a coordinated joint offensive against
the Ottoman Empire.
This is obviously only a guess on the part of some historians
but it does make sense.
The official Turkish government position today is that more research is
needed to fully understand what happened.
President Erdoğan has called
for a joint historical commission to investigate the events of 1915.
Essentially, this also means the Turkish government has moved away from a
position of total denial (“it never happened”) to a more realistic position of “we don't
really know what happened and we are willing to support historical
research to discover the truth.” This is a good position.
Regarding
the diplomacy surrounding the issue. Today's Republic of Turkey was
not in existence in
1915 and probably ought to totally ignore accusations on the subject
until their has been an international and neutral, possibly UN study
done on the subject.
Parliaments cannot legislate
history by voting on resolutions re: the Armenian genocide, which are
not based on accurate facts and figures.
Parliamentary
recognition, or the Pope's statements about the so-called Armenian
genocide really don't mean too much or carry a lot of weight in the
modern
world of today, unless it supported by massive evidence - which so far
it has not
Turkey and Armenia will need to request
the UN to do an in-depth study on the issue resulting in a binding
conclusion to finally end this drama of mutual accusations.
EU-Digest
