At this point,
the evidence that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman knew about—and
likely ordered—the death of journalist Jamal Khashoggi is compelling. After
CIA Director Gina Haspel’s presentation to Congress earlier this week, Senator
Bob Corker told reporters that a jury would find the prince guilty “in
thirty minutes.” The only holdout is the president, who continues to stand by
his statement that “we may never know all of the facts surrounding the murder
of Mr. Jamal Khashoggi.”
His support for Saudi leadership remains unwavering, even in the face of opposition from media, Congress and his own intelligence agencies.
Indeed, between special counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation’s increasing focus on Gulf money, and Trump’s repeated support for the Saudis and Emiratis in regional and international affairs, you’d be forgiven for thinking that perhaps it’s these states—not Russia—who have undue influence over the president. While there is no suggestion so far of quid pro quo between the president and his friends in the Gulf, the shady connections built during and after the 2016 election have combined with a broader network of money, personal ties, and some genuine policy agreements to produce what is perhaps the most pro-Saudi administration in U.S. histor
The United States has long pursued a generally pro-Saudi policy in the Middle East, a legacy of the Cold War when the United States relied heavily on the Saudis to push back against Soviet influence. Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical importance–and its position as the world’s swing producer of oil–has often led U.S. policymakers to minimize criticism of Saudi Arabia. Even as fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers were shown to be Saudi citizens, for example, the George W. Bush administration pushed to maintain the close U.S.-Saudi relationship while privately criticizing Saudi support for religious extremism. The Trump administration, however, has taken the United States’ selective vision on Saudi Arabia to new extremes.
In May 2018, The New York Times reported that the Mueller investigation into foreign influence in the 2016 election was looking at not just Russian, but possible Middle Eastern influence: Diplomats from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), it appeared, had facilitated meetings between Russian officials, mercenary-for-hire Erik Prince, and members of the Trump transition team. The lens quickly widened to include adviser to the Emirati government George Nader, a Lebanese-American businessman who helped to set up meetings at Trump Tower with an envoy for Saudi and Emirati leaders, and key officials including Steve Bannon and Jared Kushner.
In addition, the special counsel is apparently interested in Nader’s work on behalf of Saudi and Emirati leaders, funneling at least $2.5 million in Gulf money to Republican donor Elliott Broidy. Some of it appears to have been used for anti-Qatar lobbying following the blockade of that country in June 2017: A separate New York Times report in May 2018 pointed to two Washington, D.C., conferences featuring anti-Qatar views held by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and the Hudson Institute.
The Gulf states have been among the biggest spenders at Trump hotels and resorts since he was elected. In August of this year, the Trump hotel in New York finally reversed a two-year trend of falling revenues when Mohammed bin Salman’s extensive entourage paid premium prices for a last-minute stay. The Saudi government has also been among the biggest spenders at Trump’s Washington, D.C., hotel, spending $270,000 in 2016 alone.
Though the Trump Organization has promised that all profits received from foreign governments at these properties will be donated to the Treasury, ethics experts dispute the methods used for calculating these profits, suggesting that the president continues to profit from foreign spending. Several of Trump’s most influential backers–such as Broidy or the investor Tom Barrack—also profit handsomely from business ties and interests in the Gulf States.
The secrecy surrounding Trump’s financial affairs makes it difficult to know exactly how extensive these ties are. During the firestorm following Khashoggi’s death, Trump tweeted that he had no financial interests in Saudi Arabia. As various journalists noted, the statement could be technically true—in other words, no investments physically located within the country’s boundaries—while still misleading, given the Trump hotels’ many Saudi customers. And as always, Trump’s family members further complicate the picture. Over the last few years, for example, the Kushner family’s attempts to refinance or sell their disastrous New York real estate holdings included a failed attempt to secure funding from Qatar–a fact that’s hard not to see as relevant when evaluating Kushner’s unusual hostility toward Doha.
Read more: A Guide to Saudi Arabia’s Influence in Washington | The New Republic
His support for Saudi leadership remains unwavering, even in the face of opposition from media, Congress and his own intelligence agencies.
Indeed, between special counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation’s increasing focus on Gulf money, and Trump’s repeated support for the Saudis and Emiratis in regional and international affairs, you’d be forgiven for thinking that perhaps it’s these states—not Russia—who have undue influence over the president. While there is no suggestion so far of quid pro quo between the president and his friends in the Gulf, the shady connections built during and after the 2016 election have combined with a broader network of money, personal ties, and some genuine policy agreements to produce what is perhaps the most pro-Saudi administration in U.S. histor
The United States has long pursued a generally pro-Saudi policy in the Middle East, a legacy of the Cold War when the United States relied heavily on the Saudis to push back against Soviet influence. Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical importance–and its position as the world’s swing producer of oil–has often led U.S. policymakers to minimize criticism of Saudi Arabia. Even as fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers were shown to be Saudi citizens, for example, the George W. Bush administration pushed to maintain the close U.S.-Saudi relationship while privately criticizing Saudi support for religious extremism. The Trump administration, however, has taken the United States’ selective vision on Saudi Arabia to new extremes.
In May 2018, The New York Times reported that the Mueller investigation into foreign influence in the 2016 election was looking at not just Russian, but possible Middle Eastern influence: Diplomats from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), it appeared, had facilitated meetings between Russian officials, mercenary-for-hire Erik Prince, and members of the Trump transition team. The lens quickly widened to include adviser to the Emirati government George Nader, a Lebanese-American businessman who helped to set up meetings at Trump Tower with an envoy for Saudi and Emirati leaders, and key officials including Steve Bannon and Jared Kushner.
In addition, the special counsel is apparently interested in Nader’s work on behalf of Saudi and Emirati leaders, funneling at least $2.5 million in Gulf money to Republican donor Elliott Broidy. Some of it appears to have been used for anti-Qatar lobbying following the blockade of that country in June 2017: A separate New York Times report in May 2018 pointed to two Washington, D.C., conferences featuring anti-Qatar views held by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and the Hudson Institute.
The Gulf states have been among the biggest spenders at Trump hotels and resorts since he was elected. In August of this year, the Trump hotel in New York finally reversed a two-year trend of falling revenues when Mohammed bin Salman’s extensive entourage paid premium prices for a last-minute stay. The Saudi government has also been among the biggest spenders at Trump’s Washington, D.C., hotel, spending $270,000 in 2016 alone.
Though the Trump Organization has promised that all profits received from foreign governments at these properties will be donated to the Treasury, ethics experts dispute the methods used for calculating these profits, suggesting that the president continues to profit from foreign spending. Several of Trump’s most influential backers–such as Broidy or the investor Tom Barrack—also profit handsomely from business ties and interests in the Gulf States.
The secrecy surrounding Trump’s financial affairs makes it difficult to know exactly how extensive these ties are. During the firestorm following Khashoggi’s death, Trump tweeted that he had no financial interests in Saudi Arabia. As various journalists noted, the statement could be technically true—in other words, no investments physically located within the country’s boundaries—while still misleading, given the Trump hotels’ many Saudi customers. And as always, Trump’s family members further complicate the picture. Over the last few years, for example, the Kushner family’s attempts to refinance or sell their disastrous New York real estate holdings included a failed attempt to secure funding from Qatar–a fact that’s hard not to see as relevant when evaluating Kushner’s unusual hostility toward Doha.
Read more: A Guide to Saudi Arabia’s Influence in Washington | The New Republic
