There is a strong consensus on the eurozone crisis among
economists and political analysts both in Europe and the United States:
for the eurozone to endure, it would need to develop into a fiscal union
and, consequently, a political one. In the same breath, however,
influential commentators argue that this is politically unfeasible in
the current context of a heightened North-South divide within Europe.
And there seems to be a strong consensus among pundits that political
union in Europe is a pipe dream.
The problem is that this oft-repeated assertion — usually
invoked as if it were irrefutable — is thrown at audiences without a
shred of evidence to back it. The naysayers simply point to the latest
European parliamentary elections as clear evidence of a rising tide of
Euroskepticism.
In doing so, they err, for they equate Eurocritics with
Euroskeptics. The French National Front and UKIP are against the very
concept of the EU; but they should not be confused with Spain’s Podemos,
Syriza in Greece, and the Italian Five Star Movement, who are against
this EU in particular.
There is a big difference. If you give Alexis
Tsipras, Pablo Iglesias or Beppe Grillo the chance of having a federal
and democratic union, with a Commission president directly elected by
the peoples of Europe, they would very likely sign up to it. Give it to
Nigel Farage or Marine Le Pen, however, and they would laugh in your
face. That is the difference between Eurocritics and Euroskeptics.
Even among the Euroskeptics, the anti-EU rhetoric has a
voting ceiling. Europe’s main political divide is not between those for
or against the EU, but between those who are more cosmopolitan — and
largely in favor of further integration under the principle of
subsidiarity — and those who would like to withdraw behind their
national borders.
That is why the National Front, UKIP and Alternative
for Germany have switched from anti-EU rhetoric to anti-immigration
discourse. They realize that their potential voters are not
anti-European, but rather those who have lost out from globalization.
Euroskeptics comprise no more than 15-20 percent of the electorate of
any European country. In Germany, the EU’s largest member state, the
figure is even lower.
That Euroskeptics are no more than 20 percent does not
necessarily mean that the remaining 80 percent are keen to create a
United States of Europe; far from it. However, the figure does call into
question the widespread assertion that political union in Europe is
impossible. There is little conclusive evidence on the subject. However,
data from the Eurobarometer
— the closest we have to a gauge for measuring public opinion in Europe
— suggest that Europeans want more, not less, integration.
The
difference is whether they live or not in the eurozone. While 67 percent
of those within the zone are in favor of the euro, only 35 percent
outside it are. In the UK the figure is 20 percent, but in Germany it
rises to 74 percent. The same can be said about having a European
identity. Up to 62 percent of those in the eurozone feel that they are
European as well as their own nationality, but outside the eurozone the
figure is 53 percent. Not surprisingly, only 39 percent of Britons feel
European (compared with 64 percent of the French).
"For
or against a European economic and monetary union with one single
currency, the euro" 67% said yes,, 26 % said no, and 7% said they don't
know.
"Do you see
yourself as Nationality only; European and Nationality; European only;
or Don't know;"- 61% considered themselves European and national, 34 %
said they were more nationally oriented, 2 % said they considered
themselves only European and 1% did not know./
Overall, the limited evidence available strongly suggests that Britons
do not want further integration, but that all other Europeans,
especially those in the eurozone, are more open to the idea.
Fortunately, the Eurobarometer
asks two more specific questions on the topic.
One is whether more
decisions should be taken at the EU level. In that respect, ‘only’ 48
percent of Europeans are in favor, so enthusiasm about giving more power
to Brussels is tepid. However, there are still more in favor than
against (40 percent). Yet again there is a difference between the
percentages within the eurozone — 50 percent — and those outside — 43
percent.
The second, and more important question, is whether the EU
should develop into a federation of nation states. Here, only 41 percent
are in favor, but, again, those against are even fewer, at 34 percent. A
whopping 25 percent just do not know.
It may well be that the peoples of Europe (especially in the eurozone)
want more integration, but that it is their national governmental elites
that are holding back because they stand to lose the most from a
greater degree of union.
For the latest EU Barometer polls click here
