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| Ukrain political and ethnic crises | 
The crisis in eastern Ukraine is far from over.
On Monday, the moderate mayor of Kharkiv, the country’s 
second-largest city, was shot while riding his bicycle. Pro-Russian 
separatists have seized another government building in the region, and 
some are holding hostage a group of European military observers. The 
United States, convinced the chaos is all being driven by Moscow, 
slapped new sanctions on top Russian officials Monday, and the Europeans
 will probably go along.
To understand what’s driving this crisis, though, it’s necessary to look
 at the region the way its residents see it, not just the way it appears
 to the outside world.
The dominant Western narrative is all too familiar: It’s good guys 
vs. bad guys. Russian aggression against Ukraine and covert backing for 
separatist groups are the main sources of conflict, creating a very real
 danger that southeastern Ukraine may soon erupt into full-scale war or 
split off and join Russia.
Throw in the kidnappings of journalists, 
targeted killings of local politicians and residents and renewed 
Ukrainian military operations against the separatists, and the whole 
region appears to be in flames—and it’s all Moscow’s doing. As U.S. 
Secretary of State John Kerry put it over the weekend, the Kremlin is 
behind the “distraction, deception and destabilization” in eastern 
Ukraine.
Unfortunately, the real story is much more complicated, and it has as
 much to do with the murky nature of Ukrainian politics as it does with 
Russia’s blatant meddling. On one level, the clashes in eastern Ukraine 
are just the latest battle between the country’s powerful and fractious 
oligarchs, for whom business interests—not the fate of Ukraine—are 
always priority number one.
The good news is that the separatists are actually quite isolated, 
according to recent accounts by the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe’s monitoring mission in eastern Ukraine. Even 
Kerry, despite his stern rhetoric, has indicated that fewer than 30 
buildings have been occupied. And a recent poll conducted by the Kyiv 
International Institute of Sociology found that the majority of 
southeastern Ukraine’s residents do not favor joining Russia; 70 percent
 want to remain in Ukraine, and only 15 percent support secession; 60 
percent do not approve of armed separatists seizing government 
buildings.
There is no doubt that Russia has been trying to destabilize Ukraine 
in the wake of the annexation of Crimea and that both sides could yet 
tumble into full-scale military conflict. But Russia is not the only 
factor shaping public opinion toward the central government in Kyiv, the
 Ukrainian capital.
From the outside, the Kyiv government is usually depicted as a band 
of selfless reformers. In fact, the differences in how it is perceived 
across the country are vast, with 78 percent of western Ukrainians but 
only 16 percent of easterners registering their approval in one recent 
poll.Easterners (and southerners, for that matter) see a cabinet 
dominated by former prime minister and current presidential candidate 
Yulia Timoshenko and her Fatherland political party, whose base of 
support is in the pro-European west of the country. Both the Party of 
Regions and Vitaly Klitchko’s UDAR party refused to join the government,
 leaving it dangerously low on eastern support.
The importance of looking beyond simplistic narratives also extends 
to politics at the regional level. When the Kyiv interim government 
appointed steel magnate and local oligarch Serhiy Taruta as governor of 
Donetsk, a major city close to the Russian border, he encountered strong
 local opposition, and the Donbas region, which includes Donetsk and 
Luhansk, soon became the main hotbed of separatist activity. Why? Many 
experts point to the influence of Ukraine’s richest businessman Rinat 
Akhmetov, who reportedly holds considerable sway over Donbas’s economic 
life, not to mention the activities of local law enforcement and 
municipal officials.
In Ukraine, political power almost always translates into control of 
property. The business elite of southeastern Ukraine is not prepared to 
surrender to a Kyiv government it sees as an instrument of Timoshenko 
(an old-school oligarch in her own right), and is likely using all means
 at its disposal, including the separatist card, to make its point.
The May 25 presidential election is the next big test, pitting 
Timoshenko against Petro Poroshenko, a prominent businessman who has 
held many senior posts in previous Ukrainian governments. A Timoshenko 
victory would spell trouble for the region’s business elite. Thus, the 
separatist unrest, which has put the actual viability of the elections 
in jeopardy, may be a hedging tactic by local oligarchs.
Ukrainian political insiders believe that Timoshenko’s control over 
the interim government in Kyiv has set off enough alarm bells that many 
oligarchs are pooling their resources and backing Poroshenko. (There is 
some evidence that Poroshenko and Klitchko traveled to Vienna in late 
March to hammer out a deal with Dmitro Firtash, a prominent Ukrainian 
oligarch who was recently indicted by U.S. law enforcement and is 
fighting extradition on racketeering charges.) After all, various 
Ukrainian oligarchs helped bankroll the Maidan movement, the protests 
that ousted President Viktor Yanukovych in February, because they were 
angry with the Yanukovych “family” for squeezing them out of lucrative 
businesses. They certainly do not want to see Timoshenko install herself
 as the top dog and make their lives miserable.
The unseemliness of Ukrainian politics certainly makes for strange 
bedfellows. In this instance, it has put some Ukrainian oligarchs on the
 same side as Vladimir Putin and against Timoshenko, who has long been 
rumored to be on good terms with the Russian president. Both the Kremlin
 and these oligarchs have an interest in undermining the current 
government in Kyiv. The Kremlin and the oligarchs may have their own 
distinct reasons for doing so, but both see the separatist card as a 
source of extra leverage.
Read more: It’s Not All Russia’s Fault - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace