After the shock of the United Kingdom’s Brexit referendum and Donald
Trump’s election as President of the United States in 2016, this will be
a decisive year for Europe. Upcoming parliamentary elections in France,
Germany, the Netherlands, and possibly Italy will decide whether the
European Union will hold together, or whether it will disintegrate under
the neo-nationalist wave sweeping the West.
Meanwhile, the Brexit negotiations will begin in earnest, providing a
glimpse of the future of the EU-UK relationship. And Trump’s
inauguration on January 20 may someday be remembered as a watershed
moment for Europe.
Judging by Trump’s past statements about Europe and its relationship
with the US, the EU should be preparing for some profound shocks. The
incoming US president, an exponent of the new nationalism, does not
believe in European integration.
Here he has an ally in Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has long
tried to destabilize the EU by supporting nationalist forces and
movements in its member states. If the Trump administration supports or
turns a blind eye to those efforts, the EU – sandwiched between Russian
trolls and Breitbart News – will have to brace itself for challenging
times indeed.
The consequences for the EU will be even more serious if, in addition to
setting the US relationship with Russia on a new foundation, Trump
continues to call into question America’s security guarantee for Europe.
Such a move would be at the expense of NATO, which has
institutionalized the US security umbrella for more than six decades.
Europeans would suddenly find themselves standing alone against a Russia
that has increasingly employed military means to challenge borders,
such as in Ukraine, and to reassert its influence – or even hegemony –
over Eastern Europe.
We will soon know what comes next for NATO, but much harm has already
been done. Security guarantees are not just a matter of military
hardware. The guarantor also must project a credible message that it is
willing to defend its allies whenever necessary. Thus, such arrangements
depend largely on psychology, and on a country’s trustworthiness
vis-à-vis friends and foes alike. When that credibility is damaged,
there is a growing risk of provocation – and, with it, the threat of
escalation into larger crises, or even armed conflict.
Given this risk, the EU should now shore up what it has left with
respect to NATO and focus on salvaging its own institutional, economic,
and legal integration. But it should also look to its member states to
provide a second security option.
The EU itself is based on soft power: it was not designed to guarantee
European security, and it is not positioned in its current form to
confront a hard-power challenge. This means that it will fall to its two
largest and economically strongest countries, France and Germany, to
bolster Europe’s defense. Other countries such as Italy, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain, and Poland will also have a role to
play, but France and Germany are indispensable.
Of course, living in continental Europe means having Russia as a
neighbor, and neighborly relations, generally speaking, should be based
on peace, cooperation, and mutual respect (especially when one’s
neighbor is a nuclear power). But Europeans cannot harbor any illusions
about Russia’s intent. The Kremlin approaches foreign policy as a
zero-sum game, which means that it will always prioritize military
strength and geopolitical power over cooperative security arrangements.
Russia does not view weakness or the lack of a threat from its neighbors
as a basis for peace, but rather as an invitation to extend its own
sphere of influence. So, power asymmetry in Eastern Europe will lead
only to instability. If Europe wants a stable, enduring peace, it first
must ensure that it is taken seriously, which is clearly not the case
today. Europe can credibly strengthen its security only if France and
Germany work together toward the same goal, which they will have an
opportunity to do after their elections this year.
EU diplomats used to murmur off the record that Germany and France would
never see eye to eye on military and financial issues, owing to their
different histories and cultures. But if security conditions take a turn
for the worse, that may no longer be the case. Indeed, reaching a
compromise on both sides of the Rhine should not be so difficult: France
undoubtedly has the experience to lead on defense; and the same goes
for Germany on financial matters.
If pursuing this European security option prompts the US to renew its
own security guarantee, so much the better. Meanwhile, the EU should
also forge a post-Brexit cooperative strategic arrangement with the UK,
whose geopolitical position and security interests will remain
unchanged.The old EU developed into an economic power because it was
protected beneath the US security umbrella. But without this guarantee,
it can address its current geopolitical realities only by developing its
own capacity to project political and military power. Six decades after
the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community, history
and current developments are pushing France and Germany to shape
Europe’s future once again.