Almere-Digest

December 20, 2018

SYRIA: Trump shocks allies and advisors with plan to pull troops out of Syria

Trump shocks allies and advisers with plan to pull US troops out of Syria

December 18, 2018

Britain and the Brexit Impasse: A national government or “no deal” - by Brendan Donelly

In a recent article for the New York Times, the distinguished historian of the Conservative Party, Professor Tim Bale, argued that the “will to power” of the Conservative Party would enable it in the long term to reconstruct its inner cohesion, currently compromised by the Brexit debate. Professor Bale’s argument is controversial but, even if accurate from a historical perspective, it is highly unlikely to be reflected in the functioning of the Party over the crucial next three months. Last Wednesday’s ballot of Conservative MPs was at best a Pyrrhic victory for the Prime Minister. The 117 votes recorded against her probably if anything understated the degree of opposition to her proposed texts for the Withdrawal Agreement from the EU and its accompanying Political Declaration. It is clear she cannot possibly rely on her Parliamentary Party to steer these proposals through the House of Commons against the opposition of the Labour Party and others.

But there is no conceivable majority among Conservative MPs for any other course of action either. A divided and dysfunctional Conservative Party is generating a divided and dysfunctional Conservative government. There is no reason at all to believe that this division can be overcome by any sudden outbreak of unity before 29 March 2019. The true lesson of the past tumultuous week in British politics is that no Conservative government is capable of adopting, much less implementing, a coherent alternative position to that of the United Kingdom’s leaving the EU by automatic operation of Article 50 on 29 March 2019. If in three months there is still a Conservative government, then “crashing out” of the EU without a negotiated withdrawal will have become inevitable. That important minority in the Conservative Parliamentary party favourable to this outcome need only persevere in their current obstructionist tactics to gain their goal through the asymmetric workings of Article 50. Under Article 50 “no deal” emphatically means “no deal.”

There has been much talk in recent days of Parliament’s “taking back control of Brexit.” Amber Rudd has specified cross-party discussions to explore the possibility of a “soft Brexit” involving British membership of the EEA. This particular suggestion seems to rest on a number of questionable assumptions. The issue of British membership of the EEA is not one that in any circumstances can be resolved between now and 29 March 2019. If the EEA option is one the UK wishes to pursue after Brexit, it will need to be painstakingly negotiated with the EU during the “transition period.” The most that the EU might be willing to accept in this connection over the next three months would be changes to the wording of the non-binding Political Declaration, pointing towards future British membership of the EEA. It is more than doubtful however whether such marginal changes would be sufficient to guarantee or even make more likely a Parliamentary majority for the Prime Minister’s “deal.” Some Labour MPs either favour or could accept an EEA-like arrangement, but the majority do not, including Jeremy Corbyn and Sir Keir Starmer, both of whom for different reasons would have difficulties in accepting the Freedom of Movement at the heart of the EEA. Most importantly, if the EU were to be persuaded at this late stage to make changes to the Political Declaration, it could only be at the pressing and well-grounded request of the sitting British government. No present or future present Conservative government could ever accept favourable references in the Political Declaration to the EEA and Freedom of Movement. Most pressure on the government from the Conservative Party during the Brexit negotiations has come from precisely the opposite direction, seeking to reduce rather than maintain ties with the EU after Brexit. The EEA can provide no solution to the Conservative government’s present impasse.

Note EU-Digest: Re: Brexit: Britain and Britain's political establishment seem to be "up the creek without a paddle", and the so-called Brexiteers are not to be heard from or seen. A wise lesson for European citizens not to vote for Populist, Nationalist or Ultra Right parties in local or the upcoming May 2019 EU parliamentary elections. It's all empty rhetoric what these parties are producing. Just look at Britain (Brexit) and the USA (Donald Trump) to underscore that point.

Read more at: Brexit: A national government or “no deal” | The Federal Trust

Britain - Brexit: May sets January date for parliamentary Brexit vote

Theresa May sets January date for MPs' Brexit vote -

December 17, 2018

HUNGARY -Ddemonstrations - Labor Rule Protests: PM Victor Orban's rule becoming more and more dictatorial

Around 10,000 in Hungary protest, calling a new labor rule a ‘slave law’

December 16, 2018

United Nations - Poland - COP24: 200 Nations reach deal to implement the Paris Climate Accord

200 Nations today Saturday December 15 reached a deal to implement the Paris climate goals, after all-night negotiations to hammer out a plan to limit global temperature rises exposed a range of conflicts.

December 14, 2018

EU -Turkey-Russian Energy Cooperation: "Politics can make strange bedfellows" - Russia’s Gas Strategy Gets Help From Turkey - by Marc Pierini

Politics/Energy can make strange bedfellows

It was November 19 in Istanbul. There, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held a ceremony marking the completion of the first underwater segment of the Turkish Stream gas pipeline, linking Russia to Turkey’s European shores. The project is a vivid illustration of Moscow’s strategy to strengthen its position in supplying gas to Europe while reducing its reliance on the Ukrainian transit corridor.

For Ankara, the project is a symbol of Turkey’s independent decisionmaking and of the country’s significance in the wider region. Seen from Ankara, Turkish Stream serves a political purpose. It celebrates the blossoming friendship between Turkey and Russia and confirms Ankara’s ambition to be part of the solution to major international issues—in this case, securing the gas needs for a large part of the EU.

However, Turkish Stream will also increase Ankara’s dependence on Moscow for its energy needs.

The project’s second meaning is that Turkey is contributing to an essential element of Russia’s multi-pronged, long-term strategy of remaining Europe’s major gas supplier, while creating a “third gas corridor” in addition to the Ukrainian and Baltic Sea supply routes. This strategy is unfolding on several fronts: in Ukraine; in the Baltic Sea; and through future extensions of Turkish Stream to southern and central Europe (toward Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Slovakia, and to Greece and Italy.)

This Russian strategy has raised continuous opposition from the United States.

It is also worth noting that Turkish Stream is not part of the EU’s Energy Union plans since it does not contribute to diversification of supplies. In fact, it will rather reinforce Russia’s market predominance in both Turkey and the EU.

In Ukraine, the multi-pipeline network channeling Russian gas to Western Europe will remain a vital link. But reducing its use could inflict massive losses in terms of transit costs for authorities in Kiev, which is part of Russia’s strategy in Ukraine.

Much will depend on negotiations for the extension of the Russia-Ukraine commercial agreement, which will end in 2019. To help alleviate Kiev’s concerns, Germany has made the continuation of transit via Ukraine an ingredient of a final agreement on Nord Stream 2, the latter being the subject of controversies within the EU.

The Russian strategy is in no way limited to selling Russian gas on the European continent. It extends much further afield in the wider Eastern Mediterranean region.

Egypt is a case in point.

Following the massive discoveries in the so-called Zohr field to the north and east of the Nile River delta, Russia bought a 30 percent stake from the Italian energy group ENI in 2016 with the consent of the Italian government, which Moscow has had a long and close relationship with. The official reason for the sale was the need for ENI to spread the risk of its Egyptian operation.

Similarly, offshore gas discoveries in Lebanese waters have attracted Russian interest— although drilling off Lebanon is largely dominated by France’s TOTAL and Italy’s ENI, who have a 40 percent share each. Russia’s NOVATEK has bought a 20 percent stake.

Russia has also made moves to control both the oil and gas sector in Syria, despite the ongoing war. The actual effect of these recent maneuvers will very much depend on the final political arrangement expected to end the almost eight-year-old civil war. Many of Syria’s oil and gas fields are located north and east of the Euphrates River, currently outside the control of regime forces. In addition, for reasons linked to the ongoing naval military activities, no offshore exploration has yet taken place in Syrian waters.

In Iraq, Russia is involved in pipeline deals in the Kurdistan region through a number of oil and gas companies, although the actual exports would have to take place through Turkish territory or possibly even through Syria in the distant future.

Such an ambitious Russia strategy is justified by Europe’s gas market fundamentals.

A stronger demand for gas in Europe is good for Russia. According to Oxford Energy, gas demand in Europe (Turkey and non-EU Eastern Europe included, except Serbia) has started rising again for three consecutive years—in 2015, 2016, and 2017—to reach a level of 548 billion cubic meters (bcm), due to continued economic recovery, the impacts of climate change, and the increased use of gas by the power sector. The trend seems to be continuing in 2018.

According to the Finnish Institute for International Affairs, Russia took advantage of several factors: economic recovery and decreasing gas production in the EU, lower Russian selling prices, and the current limited availability of non-Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) on the European market.

In addition, preexisting disputes between the EU and Russia (including an antitrust investigation against Gazprom, and a Russian complaint at the WTO) have been resolved, signaling that commercial interests on both sides have prevailed, despite a less-than-optimal political climate.

In such an environment, Russia is in a strong position to keep dominating gas supplies to the EU,

which amounted to 40 percent of extra-EU imports in 2016—although new developments could upset the current situation, such as a rapid development of LNG exports to Europe from other sources.

LNG imports amounted to only 14 percent of total extra-EU gas imports in 2017, with the main supplies coming from Qatar (41 percent), Nigeria (19 percent), and Algeria (17 percent).

In this wider context, and seen from Brussels, Turkish Stream—with a final projected capacity to deliver 31.5 bcm/y, of which 15.75 bcm/y would go to Europe —is a relatively small component of the wider gas supply chain to the EU. In fact, it would represent just over 6 percent of the EU’s imports at 2017 levels.

Yet, seen from Moscow, the pipeline is potentially a significant addition to Russia’s capabilities to export gas to Europe (Turkey included). Assuming that Turkish Stream’s second phase will be completed and operational, it would represent between 16 and 19 percent of Russian sales to the EU and Turkey (at 2017 levels and all other factors remaining unchanged).

In that sense, the ceremony on November 19 in Istanbul was more than just another photo opportunity. It was a symbol of the success of Russia’s objectives in the wider Western European area, with Turkey’s help.

Together with Russia’s S-400 missile deal with Turkey, it was a symbol of how efficiently Moscow has been using Ankara’s relative diplomatic isolation to its advantage. For Ankara, this was another way of telling the world: Turkey matters.