with news about and related
to the EU, the Netherlands,
and Almere - Europe's most modern multi-cultural city
February 21, 2019
February 20, 2019
The Netherlands: Dutch economy braces for Brexit shockwave
'A bit messy on the other side': Dutch economy braces for Brexit shockwave
Read more at:
Labels:
Brexit,
Britain,
EU,
Sockwave,
The Netherlands
February 19, 2019
The Netherlands: British citizens in the Netherlands and Brexit: A quick update as to your status if Brexit happens
If you are a British expat or British national living in the Netherlands, the end of the uncertainty regarding your legal residence in the Netherlands post-Brexit is not yet in sight. The UK parliament voted down the Brexit Agreement and a No-Deal Brexit is closer than ever.
Brexit: If there is a deal
The right of residence for UK nationals living in the Netherlands or Dutch nationals living in the UK is no longer a topic of debate. If an agreement is reached in time, it is likely that the section on rights of residence will be taken from the voted down Agreement. You can find an overview of your rights in the case of an agreement here.
Brexit: if there is No-Deal
The Dutch Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) has made known what the rights of British citizens and their family members in the Netherlands are in case of a No-Deal.
During the transition period from March 29, 2019, until July 1, 2020, British citizens and their family members legally residing, working and / or studying in the Netherlands before March 29, 2019, will keep these rights of residence.
During the transitional period, you will need to apply for a Dutch residence permit. You will receive an invitation from the IND to apply for this permit. To obtain a Dutch residence permit, you need to comply with the requirements for residence laid down in EU Law:
- Employees or self-employed persons must continue to be employed or self-employed.
- Economically inactive residents must have sufficient resources not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the Netherlands and have comprehensive health insurance coverage.
- Students must be enrolled at a recognised private or public educational institution accredited or financed by the Dutch government, and have sufficient resources to not become a burden on the social assistance system of the Netherlands as well as have comprehensive health insurance coverage.
After 5 years of legal residency in the Netherlands, you can apply for a Dutch permanent residence permit. If you already have a Dutch residence permit (temporary or permanent), nothing will change for you.
If you have an EU permanent residence permit, the IND will automatically change your permit to a Dutch permanent residence permit. IND will inform you as soon as your national permanent residence permit is ready for collection.
Do you hold another EU-nationality besides your UK nationality? You will keep your right of residence as an EU-citizen after Brexit if you continue to meet the requirements laid down in EU law.
You can find a complete No-Deal overview here.
Coming to the Netherlands post-Brexit
According to IND, you will need to fulfill the same conditions to obtain residency as any other non-EU citizen.
However, you will be exempt from the requirement to obtain a provisional residence permit (machtiging tot voorlopig verblijf or mvv) in order to travel to and enter the Netherlands for a potential long-term stay.
This means that you can first travel to the Netherlands and submit an application for residency after arrival.
Dual Citizenship
When it comes to Brexit, political initiatives have been tabled to allow British nationals living in the Netherlands to keep their UK nationality when obtaining Dutch nationality and vice versa. However, the outcome of these initiatives is most uncertain.
Luckily, the current Dutch Nationality Act already creates the possibility to obtain dual citizenship.
EU-Digest
February 18, 2019
February 16, 2019
Agri-Finance:The Major Players in Agri-Finance - by Shawn Williamson
A few years ago an accountant I know told me about some of her clients. They were a couple of guys on a mission to assemble hundreds of millions of dollars of U.S. farmland for a Canadian pension fund. That’s when I started to realize there’s a lot more going on in the world of agri-finance than you hear about. Here are some of the big players in the agri-finance universe.
The types of players include banks that specialize in agricultural loans, non-bank finance companies that do land and equipment loans, farmer-owned lending co-ops, REITs that own and manage farm real estate, private equity funds that buy cropland, sovereign wealth funds, and, of course, pension funds.
One of the big agri-finance players, the Dutch Rabo AgriFinance in Chesterfield, Missouri, is headquartered only half an hour from my office. I recently sat down with their executive vice president, Curt Hudnutt, to talk about their market share in ag lending and the overall condition of agricultural loans. Rabo makes land, operating, and equipment loans. The company also sells crop insurance and offers commodity price hedging.
One of my goals was to show you the five largest agricultural lenders in the United States. Sounds easy, right? It isn’t. You have to pull together data from the Federal Reserve and beyond, and you have to specify the criteria. Are you talking about banks that do more than half of their lending to farms, dollars in farm real estate loans, number of farm loans, or some other metric? I think the fairest way to rank them is by how many dollars in ag loans a retail lending entity held as of the end of the most recent quarter. I thought this list would just be five large banks, but I was wrong. Here are the top five ag lenders as of September 30, 2018:
The types of players include banks that specialize in agricultural loans, non-bank finance companies that do land and equipment loans, farmer-owned lending co-ops, REITs that own and manage farm real estate, private equity funds that buy cropland, sovereign wealth funds, and, of course, pension funds.
One of the big agri-finance players, the Dutch Rabo AgriFinance in Chesterfield, Missouri, is headquartered only half an hour from my office. I recently sat down with their executive vice president, Curt Hudnutt, to talk about their market share in ag lending and the overall condition of agricultural loans. Rabo makes land, operating, and equipment loans. The company also sells crop insurance and offers commodity price hedging.
One of my goals was to show you the five largest agricultural lenders in the United States. Sounds easy, right? It isn’t. You have to pull together data from the Federal Reserve and beyond, and you have to specify the criteria. Are you talking about banks that do more than half of their lending to farms, dollars in farm real estate loans, number of farm loans, or some other metric? I think the fairest way to rank them is by how many dollars in ag loans a retail lending entity held as of the end of the most recent quarter. I thought this list would just be five large banks, but I was wrong. Here are the top five ag lenders as of September 30, 2018:
- Farm Credit Services of America (ACA)
- Farm Credit Mid America (ACA)
- MetLife Insurance
- Rabo Agrifinance / Rabo Bank NA
- Compeer Financial (ACA)
Labels:
Agri Finance,
Agriculture,
EU,
Missouri,
Rabo Agrifinance,
The Netherlands,
USA
EU Renewable Energy: The Netherlands still trailing behind on EU renewable energy targets
The Netherlands is trailing the rest of Europe when it comes to reaching
sustainable energy targets, according to new figures from the European
statistics agency Eurostat.
In 2017, just 6.6% of the energy used in the Netherlands came from sustainable sources, but the target is 14% by 2020, Eurostat says. Luxembourg, where 6.4% of energy consumption derived from biofuels, hydro or wind power, solar or geothermal energy in 2017, has a 2020 target of 11%.
The Eurostat statistics show 11 EU countries had already reached their targets two years ago. In Sweden, for example, more than half the energy is sustainable.
The EU as a whole aims to make sure 20% of gross final energy consumption comes from renewable sources by 2020
Read more at: The Netherlands still trailing behind on EU renewable energy targets - DutchNews.nl
In 2017, just 6.6% of the energy used in the Netherlands came from sustainable sources, but the target is 14% by 2020, Eurostat says. Luxembourg, where 6.4% of energy consumption derived from biofuels, hydro or wind power, solar or geothermal energy in 2017, has a 2020 target of 11%.
The Eurostat statistics show 11 EU countries had already reached their targets two years ago. In Sweden, for example, more than half the energy is sustainable.
The EU as a whole aims to make sure 20% of gross final energy consumption comes from renewable sources by 2020
Read more at: The Netherlands still trailing behind on EU renewable energy targets - DutchNews.nl
Labels:
EU,
Renewable Energy,
The Netherlands
February 15, 2019
Turkey: Erdoğan’s aggression against Turkey’s Kurds—it’s personal - by Cemal Ozkahraman
Turkey’s Kurds have long faced oppression by the state. But they
have come to be seen by the Erdoğan regime as the main obstacle to its
untrammelled power.
Against the background of Turkey’s affiliation to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the European Union’s official recognition of its candidature for full membership at the Helsinki Summit in 1999 gave hope to Kurds concentrated in east and south-east Turkey that they would soon obtain political rights enabling them to represent their own regions and stimulate their culture and identity. Indeed, despite the continuation of the Turkish state’s customary denial of Kurdish realities, during the early years of the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan there was some alleviation of its treatment of the Kurds. Particularly since the June 2015 general election, however, Erdoğan’s government has returned to the old ways, clamping down on the Kurds, imprisoning their elected politicians and members of their People’s Democratic Party (HDP), notably its former leader, Selahattin Demirtaş, who has been jailed in the face of ECHR demands that he should be released.
Why did such militant antagonism towards the Kurds resurface just at the time when Turkey was on the verge of achieving a lasting peace with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)? Part of the reason is that Erdoğan is manoeuvring to regain popularity among Turkish voters before the local elections in March. Being very conscious of Turkish sensitivity with regard to Türklük (‘Turkishness’) and devlet bekasi (state security), Erdoğan constantly implies that the HDP and Demirtaş are terrorists and traitors, accusing them of supporting the PKK. By creating enemies and then spreading fears that these enemies are attempting to destroy Turkish unity, he had previously achieved substantial voters’ support for the continuation of his ‘sultanate’, enabling him to reinforce his aim of a Sunni-based, nationalist, one-party-state system of autocratic militarist enforcement in Turkish politics. He has been consistent in trying to achieve this by touching on the Turkish electorate’s most sensitive nerves, Türklük and devlet bekasi.
But this is not the only reason for his severity. It can only be fully comprehended by seeing it in terms of resentment—an autocrat’s revenge—with the HDP the most direct object for punishment.
Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the 2002, 2007 and 2011 elections, holding a majority of seats for 13 years. This enabled him to minimise the impact of traditional opposition forces, including the military and Turkish ruling elites, the ‘Kemalists’ (followers of the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk). To cement his vision of Atatürk’s Turkey, Erdoğan seeks absolute domination, and this can only be achieved by a presidential, rather than parliamentary, system.
Read more:Erdoğan’s aggression against Turkey’s Kurds—it’s personal • Social Europe
Against the background of Turkey’s affiliation to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the European Union’s official recognition of its candidature for full membership at the Helsinki Summit in 1999 gave hope to Kurds concentrated in east and south-east Turkey that they would soon obtain political rights enabling them to represent their own regions and stimulate their culture and identity. Indeed, despite the continuation of the Turkish state’s customary denial of Kurdish realities, during the early years of the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan there was some alleviation of its treatment of the Kurds. Particularly since the June 2015 general election, however, Erdoğan’s government has returned to the old ways, clamping down on the Kurds, imprisoning their elected politicians and members of their People’s Democratic Party (HDP), notably its former leader, Selahattin Demirtaş, who has been jailed in the face of ECHR demands that he should be released.
Why did such militant antagonism towards the Kurds resurface just at the time when Turkey was on the verge of achieving a lasting peace with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)? Part of the reason is that Erdoğan is manoeuvring to regain popularity among Turkish voters before the local elections in March. Being very conscious of Turkish sensitivity with regard to Türklük (‘Turkishness’) and devlet bekasi (state security), Erdoğan constantly implies that the HDP and Demirtaş are terrorists and traitors, accusing them of supporting the PKK. By creating enemies and then spreading fears that these enemies are attempting to destroy Turkish unity, he had previously achieved substantial voters’ support for the continuation of his ‘sultanate’, enabling him to reinforce his aim of a Sunni-based, nationalist, one-party-state system of autocratic militarist enforcement in Turkish politics. He has been consistent in trying to achieve this by touching on the Turkish electorate’s most sensitive nerves, Türklük and devlet bekasi.
But this is not the only reason for his severity. It can only be fully comprehended by seeing it in terms of resentment—an autocrat’s revenge—with the HDP the most direct object for punishment.
Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the 2002, 2007 and 2011 elections, holding a majority of seats for 13 years. This enabled him to minimise the impact of traditional opposition forces, including the military and Turkish ruling elites, the ‘Kemalists’ (followers of the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk). To cement his vision of Atatürk’s Turkey, Erdoğan seeks absolute domination, and this can only be achieved by a presidential, rather than parliamentary, system.
Read more:Erdoğan’s aggression against Turkey’s Kurds—it’s personal • Social Europe
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)