Diplomatic missions, think tanks, and the media are rife with
analyses of the Islamic State. Assessments of how to deal with the
jihadist group range from “wait and see” to “degrade and destroy,” and
there are even mundane controversies about whether the entity should be
called the Islamic State (IS), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS), the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), or Da’esh (the
movement’s Arabic acronym)—even though these names carry almost
identical meanings.
The bottom line is that the self-proclaimed Islamic State, which has now taken hold in large parts of Iraq and Syria, is posing unprecedented challenges to the Western community of nations. The group is a particular threat to European states. To cope with those aspects of the situation that are specific to Europe, EU leaders must focus their efforts on five key areas: counterterrorism cooperation, the interruption of financial flows to the Islamic State, humanitarian assistance, political dialogue, and long-term policy reforms.
There are striking differences between the Islamic State’s modus operandi and that of other jihadist movements active in recent years, namely al-Qaeda from September 2001 onward and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2013. Three particular contrasts are discernible.
First, the Islamic State’s current military strategy—including its funding, equipment, manpower, and operational capabilities—is much more sophisticated than anything the West has witnessed from similar groups. The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in 2001, in Djerba in 2002, in Madrid in 2004, or in London in 2005, as tragic as they were, were one-off and localized. Some were suicide operations, while others were hit-and-run bombings. In January 2013, AQIM conducted a military surge in Mali, in an attempt to “acquire” an entire country by force and turn it into a base for further operations in the region, using captured airfields and military or communication facilities; but even that attack was very modest compared with current IS operations.
The second element that distinguishes the Islamic State from other terrorist groups is the deep roots it has developed in Western Europe, the Maghreb, and Turkey, as well as the Middle East, where it has recruited several thousand jihadists. Data show that the larger contingents come from the Middle East (5,800), the Maghreb countries (5,300), the EU (2,600 to 3,000), and Turkey (anywhere between 400 and 1,000). Numbers given by official agencies are substantially higher.
More importantly, the Islamic State’s power to attract young, underemployed, loosely indoctrinated people can be very high. The combination of recruitment circuits, networks of sympathizers, and returnees from the Middle East with a mission to recruit more jihadists produces a substantial potential for social destabilization, especially as radicalized Muslim communities tend to be geographically concentrated. What is more, this radicalization is happening in a political context in which xenophobia and extreme right-wing political parties are rising at an accelerated pace.
Thirdly: The EU’s 28 countries have a total population of 505 million. Counting citizens and immigrants, these states’ Muslim population is about 20 million. For 2,600 to 3,000 young men and women to be actively involved in jihadist movements may therefore seem almost negligible.
This would be an erroneous assessment, in part because estimates are growing by the day.Given this context, the overwhelming aims for European governments must be to severely curtail the recruitment of European jihadists by the Islamic State, impede the recruits’ transit to Syria and Iraq, and put returnee militants under strict surveillance. Preventing jihadists from leaving Europe is also key. The European countries concerned have already revamped procedures and launched new forms of cooperation to address these tasks, but they should do more. The implications of such steps are momentous and concern many domains: freedom of movement within the EU, management of the Schengen area, counterterrorism coordination, antiterrorism legislation, regulation of political activities, and even freedom of expression.
Read more: The European Union Must Face the Islamic State
The bottom line is that the self-proclaimed Islamic State, which has now taken hold in large parts of Iraq and Syria, is posing unprecedented challenges to the Western community of nations. The group is a particular threat to European states. To cope with those aspects of the situation that are specific to Europe, EU leaders must focus their efforts on five key areas: counterterrorism cooperation, the interruption of financial flows to the Islamic State, humanitarian assistance, political dialogue, and long-term policy reforms.
There are striking differences between the Islamic State’s modus operandi and that of other jihadist movements active in recent years, namely al-Qaeda from September 2001 onward and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2013. Three particular contrasts are discernible.
First, the Islamic State’s current military strategy—including its funding, equipment, manpower, and operational capabilities—is much more sophisticated than anything the West has witnessed from similar groups. The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in 2001, in Djerba in 2002, in Madrid in 2004, or in London in 2005, as tragic as they were, were one-off and localized. Some were suicide operations, while others were hit-and-run bombings. In January 2013, AQIM conducted a military surge in Mali, in an attempt to “acquire” an entire country by force and turn it into a base for further operations in the region, using captured airfields and military or communication facilities; but even that attack was very modest compared with current IS operations.
The second element that distinguishes the Islamic State from other terrorist groups is the deep roots it has developed in Western Europe, the Maghreb, and Turkey, as well as the Middle East, where it has recruited several thousand jihadists. Data show that the larger contingents come from the Middle East (5,800), the Maghreb countries (5,300), the EU (2,600 to 3,000), and Turkey (anywhere between 400 and 1,000). Numbers given by official agencies are substantially higher.
More importantly, the Islamic State’s power to attract young, underemployed, loosely indoctrinated people can be very high. The combination of recruitment circuits, networks of sympathizers, and returnees from the Middle East with a mission to recruit more jihadists produces a substantial potential for social destabilization, especially as radicalized Muslim communities tend to be geographically concentrated. What is more, this radicalization is happening in a political context in which xenophobia and extreme right-wing political parties are rising at an accelerated pace.
Thirdly: The EU’s 28 countries have a total population of 505 million. Counting citizens and immigrants, these states’ Muslim population is about 20 million. For 2,600 to 3,000 young men and women to be actively involved in jihadist movements may therefore seem almost negligible.
This would be an erroneous assessment, in part because estimates are growing by the day.Given this context, the overwhelming aims for European governments must be to severely curtail the recruitment of European jihadists by the Islamic State, impede the recruits’ transit to Syria and Iraq, and put returnee militants under strict surveillance. Preventing jihadists from leaving Europe is also key. The European countries concerned have already revamped procedures and launched new forms of cooperation to address these tasks, but they should do more. The implications of such steps are momentous and concern many domains: freedom of movement within the EU, management of the Schengen area, counterterrorism coordination, antiterrorism legislation, regulation of political activities, and even freedom of expression.
Read more: The European Union Must Face the Islamic State
