At this point,
the evidence that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman knew about—and
likely ordered—the death of journalist Jamal Khashoggi is compelling. After
CIA Director Gina Haspel’s presentation to Congress earlier this week,
Senator
Bob Corker told reporters that a jury would find the prince guilty “in
thirty minutes.” The only holdout is the president, who continues to stand by
his statement that “we may never know all of the facts surrounding the murder
of Mr. Jamal Khashoggi.”
His support for Saudi leadership remains unwavering,
even in the face of opposition from media, Congress and his own intelligence
agencies.
Indeed, between special counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation’s
increasing focus on Gulf money, and Trump’s repeated support for the
Saudis and Emiratis in regional and international affairs, you’d be
forgiven for thinking that perhaps it’s these states—not Russia—who have
undue influence over the president. While there is no suggestion so far of
quid pro quo between the president and his friends in the Gulf, the shady
connections built during and after the 2016 election have combined with a
broader network of money, personal ties, and some genuine policy agreements to
produce what is perhaps the most pro-Saudi administration in U.S. histor
The United States has
long pursued a generally pro-Saudi policy in the Middle East, a legacy of the
Cold War when the United States relied heavily on the Saudis to push back
against Soviet influence. Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical importance–and its
position as the world’s swing producer of oil–has often led U.S. policymakers
to minimize criticism of Saudi Arabia. Even as fifteen of the nineteen 9/11
hijackers were shown to be Saudi citizens, for example, the George W. Bush
administration pushed to maintain the close U.S.-Saudi relationship while
privately criticizing Saudi support for religious extremism. The Trump
administration, however, has taken the United States’ selective vision on Saudi
Arabia to new extremes.
In May 2018,
The New York Times reported
that the Mueller investigation into foreign influence in
the 2016 election was looking at not just Russian, but possible Middle Eastern
influence: Diplomats from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), it appeared, had
facilitated meetings between Russian officials, mercenary-for-hire Erik Prince,
and members of the Trump transition team. The lens quickly widened to include
adviser to the Emirati government
George
Nader, a Lebanese-American businessman who helped to set up meetings
at Trump Tower with an
envoy
for Saudi and Emirati leaders,
and
key
officials including Steve Bannon and Jared Kushner.
In addition, the special counsel is apparently interested in Nader’s work on behalf of Saudi and Emirati
leaders, funneling
at
least $2.5 million in Gulf money to Republican donor Elliott Broidy.
Some of it appears to have been used for anti-Qatar lobbying following the
blockade of that country in June 2017: A separate
New York Times report
in May 2018 pointed to two Washington, D.C., conferences featuring
anti-Qatar views held by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and
the Hudson Institute.
The Gulf states have
been among the biggest spenders at Trump hotels and resorts since he was
elected. In August of this year, the Trump hotel in New York
finally reversed a two-year trend of falling revenues when Mohammed bin Salman’s extensive entourage
paid premium prices for a
last-minute stay. The Saudi government has also been among the biggest spenders
at Trump’s
Washington,
D.C., hotel, spending $270,000 in 2016 alone.
Though the Trump
Organization has promised that
all
profits received from foreign governments at these properties will
be donated to the Treasury,
ethics
experts dispute the methods used for calculating these profits,
suggesting that the president continues to profit from foreign spending.
Several of Trump’s most influential backers–such as Broidy or the investor
Tom
Barrack—also
profit
handsomely from business ties and interests in the Gulf States.
The secrecy
surrounding Trump’s financial affairs makes it difficult to know exactly how
extensive these ties are. During the firestorm following Khashoggi’s death,
Trump tweeted that he had no financial interests in Saudi Arabia. As various
journalists noted, the statement could be
technically
true—in other words, no investments physically located within the
country’s boundaries—while still misleading, given the Trump hotels’ many Saudi
customers. And as always, Trump’s family members further complicate the picture.
Over the last few years, for example, the Kushner family’s attempts to refinance
or sell their disastrous New York real estate holdings included
a
failed attempt to secure funding from Qatar–a fact that’s hard not
to see as relevant when evaluating Kushner’s
unusual
hostility toward Doha.
Read more: A Guide to Saudi Arabia’s Influence in Washington | The New Republic
