The
euobserver notes that for some time now, Turkey-Europe relations have been reduced to
monologues and non-coordinated actions by decision-makers on both sides.
Turkish leaders take every opportunity to disregard European norms,
values and principles in order to claim Turkey’s singularity, if not
superiority. This trend has accelerated since the 15 July 2016 coup
attempt, after which the ruling regime happily took the opportunity to
suppress all meaningful dissent.
Centuries-old anti-Western sentiment in Turkish politics is now riding
the wave, and Europe-bashing is the favourite topic of endless Turkish
electoral consultations.
EU accession negotiations are stuck with no less than 14 chapters
blocked in connection with the ongoing disputes over Cyprus. The
northern part of the island is under Turkish control.
There is no progress whatsoever on the 15 chapters under negotiation.
Talks have been concluded on only one chapter so far and the Turkish
side is, understandably so, not interested in opening the remaining 3
chapters as they pertain to social policy, competition policy and public
procurement.
Meanwhile, the European Commission’s yearly Progress Report on Turkey’s
advancement towards membership is thrown ostensibly into the wastepaper
basket.
Relations with the European Parliament are at their lowest level. The
latest recommendation of the parliament to freeze the negotiations with
Ankara has been declared null and void by Turkey's EU minister.
The rapporteur for Turkey at the EU parliament is an undeclared persona
non grata in the country. Indeed, the last meeting of the Joint
Parliamentary Commission between members of the Turkish parliament and
the EU parliament dates back to May 2015.
Bilateral relations with EU member states’ politicians are also at their
lowest point. We see a situation where any non-complacent declaration
or action from European side is countered with accusations of being
“Nazis” or “fascists”.
There is no more political dialogue on any issue of common concern
except the shameful refugee deal of March 2016, in which Turkish
authorities are acting on behalf of the EU to patrol for refugees moving
towards the European continent.
Turkish society no longer feels the benefits of the so-called
pre-accession phase, during which a candidate country thoroughly
prepares for membership.
The harmonisation of national legislation with the acquis communautaire,
the body of shared EU laws and principles, already brings with it a
sort of preview of what's to come after joining the bloc. Although it
could be felt strongly between 2000 and 2005, the EU dynamics began to
slowly fade away ever since.
Sub-committees in charge of EU preparations in the Turkish
administration are being dismantled and the pre-accession funds (around
€4 billion for 2014-2020) are under-used due to a lack of adequate
projects.
All in all, there is an obvious backlash in terms of European political
and economic and criteria. This was demonstrated spectacularly by the
political push for the reinstitution of the death penalty, abolished
since the year 2000.
Today, Ankara openly rejects EU membership through its actions and intentions.
On the European front, the EU commission - i.e. the secretariat in
charge of preparing any candidate country for membership - is busy with
paper pushing, as the negotiations are basically at a total standstill.
This is due to the opposition of Austria and the Netherlands, in
addition to the above mentioned “old” blockages.
Moreover, there has been a decision to halt any substantive contact with
Turkish authorities, at least until the end of German elections in
autumn.
The Schengen visa exemption for Turkish citizens, which has been
negotiated since 2013, looks impossible to implement under the present
regime.
MEPs are now, with a few exceptions, against Turkey’s membership, especially since the 16 April referendum.
In the EU member states, Turkish authorities had been marginalized even
before the present strains - now they are avoided even for photo-ops.
Finally, every single European decision-maker knows that Turkey
doesn’t comply with the Copenhagen Criteria, a compulsory set of
benchmarks for every future candidate country.
To cap it all off, following an unfree and unfair referendum, Turkey
has now been forced to adopt a presidential regime without checks or
balances - much like the 1930s fascist governments of continental
Europe.
So, what is all of this noise about pretending, on both sides, that
membership negotiations are on track and relations are going to continue
like before?
What is all of this fuss by some European politicians who are suddenly
choosing to stand by the Turkish democrats, especially those in jail for
months?
What is all of this tragic comedy by Federica Mogherini, the EU's
foreign affairs chief, to declare to the same democrats, with a
disgraceful disdain for the European values, that Europe “respects” the
result of the referendum, i.e. the choice of a fascist regime?
Let’s start with the Turkish obsession of maintaining a relationship by
angrily reacting to warnings about human rights violations and other
misdoings.
Economic vulnerability is probably the answer.
The administration of the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has
accumulated mistakes over years, refrained from in-depth reforms and
ended up by becoming dependent of high interest rates to continue to
attract speculative capital, to run the economy and fill the deficits.
High unemployment, reduced growth, feeble research and development, a
weak education system, poor savings rates, the drying up of foreign
direct investment from EU countries - all these structural problems are
potentially explosive.
The regime - despite its natural tendency towards Europe-bashing -
naively thinks that the present status quo with the EU is sufficient to
keep the economy afloat. No more, no less.
As for the Europeans, things are more complicated - as can be seen in the chaotic responses to a clearly lifeless candidacy.
Firstly, the failed candidacy of Turkey since 1973 is a unique case in
the history of enlargement. Europe does not have an institutional memory
on how to deal with the problems it throws up, exactly like Brexit.
Secondly, the economic and strategic interests are a cause for concern.
In 2016, Turkey was the EU's 4th biggest export destination with €78
billion worth of trade, and 5th biggest import source at €66 billion.
Many of these companies are European at both ends, yet they display a cautious approach to any radical move.
Strategically speaking, Europe and the West in general are adamant about
keeping Turkey in Nato and out of the Russian sphere of influence. As
for the refugee deal, although it is important, it is still a temporary
issue which will lose steam sooner or later.
Thirdly, speaking gently to Turkish democrats may be a cost-free way of
soothing consciences. However, the fact remains that the “support”
cannot go beyond words and, without governmental commitment, there is no
viable indirect channel to civil society.
Fourthly, and these concerns notwithstanding, Europeans seem rather
pleased with the failed candidacy of Turkey. Right from the beginning,
the prospect of Turkey joining the EU has never inspired a completely
determined and resourceful response from Europe.
in addition to open foes like Nicolas Sarkozy, a former French
president, the EU considered Turkey’s candidacy to be no different from
any other candidacy.
Today, the historic rendezvous that started in 1959 has lamentably ended
at the cost of all. The official end of negotiations is not 'if', but
instead 'when'.
Now if one needs to be serious and concentrate on the “achievable”
regarding the future of EU-Turkey relations, as well as the containment
of the regime, there are not many options left.
The revision of the customs union agreement of 1995 as the second best formula looks bleak, both technically and politically.
A customs union cannot function without the final objective of
membership. Politically, those who hope to tie the revision of the
agreement into conditions of economic and political good governance are
following a pipe dream - in view of the present regime.
One should understand that the Erdogan regime’s codes are structurally
anti-European. Likewise, member states that are against the continuation
of negotiations are also against the revision of the customs agreement.
The free trade agreement (FTA) option still remains, like with any other
non-EU country, but maybe an enhanced one in the case of Turkey, which
has already integrated to a certain degree.
As for the containment, with a lack of any concrete leverage, there are no quick fixes.
The only principle, though, should be to avoid the appeasement of that
kind of regime, unlike what had happened in Munich in 1938.
EU-Digest
