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| Politics/Energy can make strange bedfellows | 
 
 
 
It was November 19 in Istanbul. There, Russian President Vladimir Putin 
and Turkish President Recep Tayyip ErdoÄŸan held a ceremony marking the 
completion of the first underwater segment of the 
Turkish Stream gas pipeline,
 linking Russia to Turkey’s European shores. The project is a vivid 
illustration of Moscow’s strategy to strengthen its position in 
supplying gas to Europe while reducing its reliance on the Ukrainian 
transit corridor.
For Ankara, the project is a symbol of 
Turkey’s independent decisionmaking and of the country’s significance in
 the wider region. Seen from Ankara, Turkish Stream serves a political 
purpose. It celebrates the 
blossoming friendship between Turkey and Russia
 and confirms Ankara’s ambition to be part of the solution to major 
international issues—in this case, securing the gas needs for a large 
part of the EU. 
However, Turkish Stream will also increase Ankara’s dependence on Moscow for its energy needs.
The project’s second meaning is that 
Turkey is contributing to an essential element of Russia’s 
multi-pronged, long-term strategy of remaining Europe’s major gas 
supplier, while creating a “third gas corridor” in addition to the 
Ukrainian and Baltic Sea supply routes. This strategy is unfolding on 
several fronts: in Ukraine; in the Baltic Sea; and through 
future extensions of Turkish Stream to southern and central Europe (toward Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Slovakia, and to Greece and Italy.)  
 
This Russian strategy has raised continuous 
opposition from the United States.
It is also worth noting that Turkish Stream is not part of the 
EU’s Energy Union
 plans since it does not contribute to diversification of supplies. In 
fact, it will rather reinforce Russia’s market  predominance in both 
Turkey and the EU.
In Ukraine, the multi-pipeline network channeling Russian gas to Western Europe will remain a 
vital link.
 But reducing its use could inflict massive losses in terms of transit 
costs for authorities in Kiev, which is part of Russia’s strategy in 
Ukraine.
Much will depend on negotiations for the 
extension of the Russia-Ukraine commercial agreement, which will end in 
2019. To help alleviate Kiev’s concerns, Germany has made the 
continuation of transit via Ukraine an ingredient of a final agreement 
on 
Nord Stream 2, the latter being the subject of controversies within the EU.
The Russian strategy is in no way limited 
to selling Russian gas on the European continent. It extends much 
further afield in the wider Eastern Mediterranean region.
Egypt is a case in point.
Following the massive discoveries in the so-called Zohr field to the north and east of the Nile River delta, Russia bought a 
30 percent stake
 from the Italian energy group ENI in 2016 with the consent of the 
Italian government, which Moscow has had a long and close relationship 
with. The official reason for the sale was the need for ENI to spread 
the risk of its Egyptian operation.
Similarly, offshore gas discoveries in 
Lebanese waters have attracted Russian interest— although drilling off 
Lebanon is largely dominated by France’s TOTAL and Italy’s ENI, who have
 a 40 percent share each. Russia’s 
NOVATEK has bought a 20 percent stake.
Russia has also made moves to control both the oil and gas sector in 
Syria,
 despite the ongoing war. The actual effect of these recent maneuvers 
will very much depend on the final political arrangement expected to end
 the almost eight-year-old civil war. Many of Syria’s oil and gas fields
 are located north and east of the Euphrates River, currently outside 
the control of regime forces. In addition, for reasons linked to the 
ongoing naval military activities, no offshore exploration has yet taken
 place in Syrian waters.
In 
Iraq, Russia is involved in pipeline deals in the 
Kurdistan region
 through a number of oil and gas companies, although the actual exports 
would have to take place through Turkish territory or possibly even 
through Syria in the distant future.
Such an ambitious Russia strategy is justified by Europe’s gas market fundamentals.
A stronger demand for gas in Europe is good for Russia. According to 
Oxford Energy,
 gas demand in Europe (Turkey and non-EU Eastern Europe included, except
 Serbia) has started rising again for three consecutive years—in 2015, 
2016, and 2017—to reach a level of 548 billion cubic meters (bcm), due 
to continued economic recovery, the impacts of climate change, and the 
increased use of gas by the power sector. The trend seems to be 
continuing in 2018.
According to the 
Finnish Institute for International Affairs,
 Russia took advantage of several factors: economic recovery and 
decreasing gas production in the EU, lower Russian selling prices, and 
the current limited availability of non-Russian liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) on the European market.
In addition, preexisting disputes between the EU and Russia (including an antitrust investigation against 
Gazprom, and a Russian complaint at the 
WTO)
 have been resolved, signaling that commercial interests on both sides 
have prevailed, despite a less-than-optimal political climate.
 
In such an environment, Russia is in a strong position to keep dominating gas supplies to the EU, 
which amounted to 
40 percent of extra-EU imports in 2016—although
 new developments could upset the current situation, such as a rapid 
development of LNG exports to Europe from other sources.
LNG imports
 amounted to only 14 percent of total extra-EU gas imports in 2017, with
 the main supplies coming from Qatar (41 percent), Nigeria (19 percent),
 and Algeria (17 percent).
In this wider context, and seen from Brussels, 
Turkish Stream—with
 a final projected capacity to deliver 31.5 bcm/y, of which 15.75 bcm/y 
would go to Europe —is a relatively small component of the wider gas 
supply chain to the EU. In fact, it would represent just over 6 percent 
of the EU’s imports at 2017 levels.
Yet, seen from Moscow, the pipeline is 
potentially a significant addition to Russia’s capabilities to export 
gas to Europe (Turkey included). Assuming that Turkish Stream’s second 
phase will be completed and operational, it would represent between 16 
and 19 percent of Russian sales to the EU and Turkey (at 2017 levels and
 all other factors remaining unchanged).
In that sense, the ceremony on November 19
 in Istanbul was more than just another photo opportunity. It was a 
symbol of the success of Russia’s objectives in the wider Western 
European area, with Turkey’s help. 
Together with Russia’s S-400 missile 
deal with Turkey, it was a symbol of how efficiently Moscow has been 
using Ankara’s relative diplomatic isolation to its advantage. For 
Ankara, this was another way of telling the world: Turkey matters.
Read more: Russia’s Gas Strategy Gets Help From Turkey - Carnegie Europe - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace